We consider network graphs G = (V, E) in which adjacent nodes share common secrets. In this setting, certain techniques for perfect end-to-end security (in the sense of confidentiality, authenticity (implying integrity) and availability, i.e., CIA+) can be made applicable without end-to-end shared secrets and without computational intractability assumptions. To this end, we introduce and study the concept of a unique-neighborhood network, in which nodes are uniquely identifiable upon their graph-topological neighborhood. While the concept is motivated by authentication, it may enjoy wider applicability as being a technology-agnostic (yet topology aware) form of addressing nodes in a network.
Introduction
Let a network be given as an undirected graph G = (V, E), in which node adjacency {u, v} ∈ E is characterized by two nodes u and v sharing a common secret (key). Consider the following question:
Can any two nodes u, v ∈ V , which are not adjacent (i.e., {u, v} / ∈ E) exchange messages with computationally unconditional privacy, authenticity and reliability?
By its formulation, an answer cannot use any complexity-theoretic intractability assumptions, thus ruling out public-key cryptographic techniques. Availability is typically a matter of redundancy, and it is known that both, unconditional privacy and availability are both achievable by certain graph connectivity properties and Multipath transmission (MPT) based on secret sharing [10] . In the simplest yet provably most efficient setting [4] , Alice sends a message m to Bob according to the following scheme:
1. Alice encodes m into a set s 1 , . . . , s k shares, so that any d out of these k shares suffice to reconstruct the message, while no set of less than d shares leaks any information about m. This is a standard application of polynomial (d, k)-threshold secret sharing [9] .
2. Alice chooses a set of k node-disjoint paths π 1 , . . . , π k from her node to Bob. Herein, two paths π i , π j are said to be node-disjoint, if they satisfy V (π 1 ) ∩ V (π 2 ) = {Alice, Bob}, where V (π) is the vertex set of the path. That is, any two paths intersect nowhere in G except at the end-points.
3. Bob reconstructs the secret as usual for polynomial secret sharing, potentially recovering from up to (k − d)/2 errors. This recovery is possible by the Welch-Berlekamp algorithm [2] , exploiting the known "isomorphy" between polynomial secret sharing and Reed-Solomon encoding [5] .
This form of MPT achieves confidentiality against any attacker being able to sniff on < d nodes, by design of the secret sharing. Reliability of the transmission follows from the error correction capability of the sharing treated as an error-correcting code. Note that this protocol does not need any point-to-point encryption, if the attacker is constrained to eavesdrop on nodes only, and on strictly less than d of them. This is what we shall assume w.l.o.g. throughout the paper 1 . The obstacle towards practical implementations of this scheme is the network needing to provide k node-disjoint paths. This property is, by a Theorem of H.Whitney [3, Thm. 5 .17] equivalent to k-vertex-connectivity of G: a graph G = (V, E) is k-connected (more specifically k-vertex-connected), if it takes at least k nodes to be removed from G until the graph becomes disconnected. That is, Alice and Bob cannot be disconnected by removing up to any k − 1 nodes between them. Whitney's theorem equates this condition to the existence of k node-disjoint paths between Alice and Bob. While this is a strong connectivity requirement in general, 2-connectivity is a highly common feature of networks for the sake of resilience against single node failures. The general problem of extending a graph into k-connectedness is computationally intractable [7] , but the construction of large k-connected graphs from smaller ones is inductively easy [6] :
1. Start with the ⊆-smallest 2 k-connected graph, which is the complete graph K k+1 .
Given any two
The case of an attacker being able to listen on all the lines in a network requires point-topoint encryption, which, for unconditional security, would call for additional techniques like quantum key distribution protocols (e.g., BB84 [1] ) in the network. We leave such technological extensions aside in this work, and shall remain independent of any such assumptions in stating that shared secrets just "exist", without adopting any prescriptions on how this is practically done.
2 Herein, the subgraph relation 
Thus, if the network is to be constructed from scratch in a hierarchical fashion, maintaining it k-connected is a simple matter of proper connections between subnetworks into the bigger network.
Authenticity is a different story, but achievable along similar lines: Multipath authentication (MPA) resembles the common form of how hand-written signatures are verified in companies. Departments typically maintain samples of the handwritten signature of a decision maker to verify it on paper documents (otherwise, anyone could just scrawl some name and claim it to be someone else's handwritten signature). The digital version of this procedure uses the point-to-point shared secrets to mimic a "signature" by a conventional Message authentication code (MAC). Specifically, if Alice's node v has a neighbor set nb(v) = {w ∈ V : {v, w} ∈ E}, and shares a key s i with each neighbor i ∈ nb(v). She can use these to undersign a message using a set of MACs under the keys s 1 , . . . , s k for k ≤ |nb(Alice)|. Bob, upon reception of the MACs, can ask Alice's neighbors for verification, and properly react upon their replies (along node-disjoint paths again). This protocol is depicted in Figure 1 and, using techniques of game theory and universal hashing for the functions M AC and h, is provably secure without any computational intractability assumptions [8] . It must be noted that the vertex-connectivity number k of the graph needs not be equal to the number of neighbors or paths used; it must only be large enough to admit the sought number of neighbors/paths. As such, the number (here k) of paths can be less than the vertex-connectivity number of the graph (also denoted as k here).
The remaining question concerns the uniqueness of Bob in being the "signer" of the message in the MPA scheme. Is it only Alice that could have attached the MAC set {M AC(h(m), k i ) : i ∈ nb(Alice)}? Apparently so, if the neighborhood of Alice uniquely characterizes, resp. distinguishes, her from all other nodes in the network. This, however, is a nontrivial property of a graph, and in the center of study in this work hereafter.
Problem Statement
We study the problem of characterizing a node v ∈ V based only on its graphtopological neighborhood, i.e., we are interested in graphs with the following property:
The existence of such graphs is immediate by simple examples, such as lines (Figure 2a) , circles, or the complete graph. The property, however, may arise or vanish upon adding edges. For instance, the graph in Figure 2c is a UNN, but loses this property upon adding the edge {2, 4} to it, as in Figure 2d . It regains unique-neighborhoods, however, when the edges {1, 3} and {2, 4} are added ( Figure 2b ).
An Algebraic Condition to Test for UNN
Hereafter, let n = |V | be the number of nodes in G. Let A ∈ {0, 1} n×n be the graph's adjacency matrix, with a ij = 1 whenever node i is connected to node j and zero otherwise. Each row/column of the matrix thus corresponds to a node, and the i-th row in A can be taken as a vector of indicators, describing the neighbourhood of node i. Likewise, since G is undirected and A is hence symmetric, the same goes for the columns of A.
A UNN has pairwise distinct rows/columns, so it is conceptually straightforward to sort the rows of A in any order, and to look for adjacent identical rows. While the problem is algorithmically easy, we can also give an algebraic condition to induce the UNN property. Several sufficient conditions are immediate to imply distinct rows, such as full rank of the adjacency matrix A, or the matrix being orthogonal. Those, however, is also necessary, so these are overly strong for our purposes.
In a more direct approach, we can directly ask for pairwise distinctness, and it turns out that this is easy to cast into an algebraic condition: let x i be the i-th row of the adjacency matrix A. Consider the ij-th entry a
ij shall be a reminder that we indeed do not just square a ij , since actually a
. If i = j, then two cases are possible:
2. Otherwise, if x i = x j , then the sum giving x T i x j will be such that at least one 1-entry in x i "matches" with a 0-entry in x j (or vice versa), since otherwise, the two vectors would be identical. Thus, the sum x T i x j must be strictly less than x T i x i (by at least 1), since this latter expression has all 1-entries count into the result, as opposed to x T i x j having at least one 1-entry being cancelled out by the other factor. Now, look into the first row of A 2 = A T A = AA T : in this row, we have all scalar products x T 1 x i , for which the result is always ≤ x T 1 x 1 , with equality if and only if x i = x 1 . That is, we can test for another copy of x 1 to exist by looking if all entries are less than the first. This is already half the test: the matrix A has pairwise distinct rows if and only if the diagonal element in the i-th row of A 2 is strictly greater than all other elements in that row (likewise, column).
We can convert this into an algebraic inequality condition: write 1 n×m to mean the (n × m)-matrix of all 1-entries, and observe that x T i x i appears in all columns along the i-th row in A · 1 n×n . Our condition asks for the diagonal to be strictly larger than the other elements in the same row, and all we have left to do "artificially increase" the actual diagonal by 1 so that the <-condition holds there too (otherwise we would have equality).
Overall, we end up with the following conclusion:
with n = |V | nodes is a UNN, if and only if its adjacency matrix A satisfies
where I n is the n-th identity matrix and the inequality holds per element.
Note that by symmetry, the resulting number of constraints is twice as many as needed, since the inequality will hold for the upper triangle in the same way as for the lower triangle; the diagonal does not need to be considered either.
For directed networks, observe that we did not use the symmetry of A anywhere, the same derivation can be applied to give a condition for unique neighborhoods, now defined in terms of incoming or outgoing edges. Unique outgoing neighbourhoods correspond to pairwise distinct rows, while unique incoming neighbourhoods correspond to pairwise distinct columns.
Corollary 1. Let G = (V, E) be a directed graph, and let A be its adjacency matrix. The graph G is a UNN,
• with unique outgoing edges, if and only if, A · 1 n×n + I n − AA T ≥ 1 n×n ,
• with unique incoming edges, if and only if,
where the inequality holds per element.
Both conditions, by symmetry of A, boil down to (1) if G is undirected. Constructing optimal networks w.r.t. to some cost function c : {0, 1} n×n → R on the adjacency matrix is then a matter of constrained nonlinear optimization:
The problem for directed graphs is straightforward by replacing the constraints accordingly. One instance of (2) could be, for example, looking for the smallest UNN in which a given graph G appears as a subgraph. Conversely, we can look for the largest subgraph inside G that is a UNN. This is done in the next section.
Construction and Encounter of UNNs
It is highly unlikely that random graphs, e.g., scale-free or others come up as UNNs. Taking the internet as an example of a scale-free topology, just consider an Internet service provider (ISP) with a set of customers. Each customer is typically connected to only one ISP, making this node the only and hence nonunique neighborhood of the customer. However, an ISPs located in the center of a star topology may consider its customers as a unique neighborhood to another ISP, unless the two have an identical lot of customers. Though a graph G = (V, E) may not be a UNN, is there perhaps a subgraph G = (V , E ) with V ⊆ V, E ⊆ E that is a UNN? A positive answer is reached by looking at trees first. First, let us define the degree of a node v in an undirected graph is the number |nbv|. Lemma 1. Let G = (V, E) be a tree, and let S be the set of all nodes having degree 1 in G. Then, all nodes in V \ S have unique neighborhoods in (the full graph) G.
Proof. The nodes in S are all leafs in the tree, and their inclusion leaves the mapping f : v → nb(v) restricted to inner nodes only. Consequently, we consider injectivity of f only on the set V \ S, but with the neighborhood nb being determined by the full set V . For any two inner nodes u, v, those may have the same parents, but since G is a tree, they have distinct children, thus making the corresponding neighborhood (composed from parents and children, possibly also from S) pairwise distinct.
Lemma 1 is not optimal in the sense that a leaf that is singleton (in the sense of having no "siblings", i.e., sharing its parent with no other vertex in G) can be included, and the graph remains a UNN. More generally, we can even connect any two disjoint UNNs by a single or multiple edges, with the resulting graph again being a UNN.
Proof. Since we connect a node u i to v i (only), the neighborhoods of both are just extended by the other. But since neither node appears in the other graph, the neighborhoods remain distinct. The remaining nodes that were not involved in the connection between G 1 , G 2 retain their neighborhoods as they were, which are again unique since the graphs were vertex-disjoint.
Unfortunately, Lemma 2 does not lend itself to a greedy construction algorithm for a node-or edge-minimal UNN, since the property is non-monotone in terms of the subgraph relation, as the example graphs in Figure 2 show. Thus, the set of all UNNs does not form a matroid. Still, Lemma 2 allows to inductively construct large UNNs by starting from small UNNs and connecting them in the way as described by the Lemma. The initial "atomic" networks can be constructed from scratch, much in the same way as we can construct kconnected networks. Indeed, since the complete graph K k+1 is trivially a UNN, we can even simultaneously preserve both properties, UNN and k-connectivity, upon an inductive construction of large networks.
More interesting for our purposes is the corollary from these two results:
Corollary 2. Every undirected graph G = (V, E) has a vertex-maximal subgraph G = (V , E ) that is a UNN, and which only excludes nodes (if any) of degree 1 in G.
Proof. Take T = (V T , E T ) as any spanning tree in G, then Lemma 1 tells that every inner node of T has unique neighborhoods. Let V o T be the set of inner nodes in T , and let
be an arbitrary node for which all u ∈ nb(v) have degree 1. That is, v is a(ny) node that is directly connected to leaf nodes in T . For each such node v, we can pick exactly one of its children c ∈ V T (a leaf) arbitrarily, and add the edge {v, c} to E . By Lemma 2, the so-extended tree remains a UNN. Moreover, it is a vertex-maximal such subgraph, since adding any further leaf node connected to some v ∈ V o T , we would end up with two children c 1 , c 2 of v whose common neighborhood is {v}. Since T was spanning, there are no other nodes that we could add.
Obviously by construction, Corollary 2 only assures a UNN subgraph of "minimal" vertex-connectivity as being a tree. To benefit from the aforementioned possibility of preserving k-connectivity besides being a UNN when the graph grows, Corollary 2 is apparently not very useful as the inner UNN is only 1-connected. Its primary applicability is rather to provide a starting point for optimization like in (2): if G is not a UNN, we can pick a maximal subgraph of G that is a UNN, and keep adding edges (from G or new ones), until G has been extended into the "smallest" UNN that covers G.
Graph-Topological Addressing and Security
The existence of a vertex-maximal subgraph being a UNN is not at all surprising, but the important fact is that the network is a UNN until the "last mile" to the customer, who typically is a node of degree 1. Routing messages into such nodes, however, makes sense only if the node itself is already the receiver, so the actual addressing is only needed until the hop right before the final node. Once this butlast node has been reached, the final point-to-point connection needs no further addressing.
Corollary 2 is thus the final key to "technology agnostic addressing" in the sense as we look for: let G = (V, E) be any network that is not necessarily a UNN. Within G, we can construct a minimal spanning tree (by known algorithms), which relative to the entire network G is already a UNN. All nodes outside this UNN are excluded only for sharing a common connection point into the UNN T . Now, consider the nodes in T as ISPs, arranged in some hierarchical structure that the tree reflects, then the nodes outside T are all customers connected to the same ISP, but these are directly reachable from their individual ISP node. Thus, we only nodes with a non-unique neighborhoods are the ISPs's customers, while within the larger (inter)net, nodes can be addressed purely using their localities.
The addressing of nodes based on their neighborhoods is agnostic of technology, but in the same degree needs to be aware of topology. As such it may not be applicable in certain specialized domains such as on-chip networks or ad hoc networks. The main area of application are hence fixed network installations such as those maintained by ISPs.
This technological/graph-topological effort comes with a significant practical advantage from the perspective of usable security: it requires key-management in the sense of exchanging common secrets, only between a considerably small number of nodes. Precisely, while symmetric end-to-end encryption in a network of n nodes would require O(n 2 ) keys to be exchanged, multipath schemes as described here require only |E| such keys to be shared between direct neighbors, while still providing end-to-end security without computational intractability. More important from a practical perspective is the fact that the key-management does not need to rest with Alice or Bob as users: unlike public-key encryption that relies on complex certificate management that to a wide extent runs on the application layer (and hence is in Alice and Bob's direct hands), multipath transmission and UNN maintenance (i.e., establishment, broadcast and updates to neighborhoods) can run entirely below the application layer, thus providing addressing and confidentiality in a technology agnostic form and completely transparent for all users. Especially matters of maintaining a UNN are flexible and do not need to take into account the entire network topology: an implicit point made in the proof of Corollary 2 is the fact that we do not need all graphtopological neighbors, while it suffices to include only a selection of them to define unique neighborhoods. This also extends to the key-management: for MPA, it is only necessary to share keys with the neighbors relevant for the addressing, but not with all neighbors that may physically exist. Thus, the lot of key material maintained by the network additionally shrinks, since the "inner" UNN is merely a spanning tree inside the actual network, on which shared keys are required. Since a tree with n nodes has m = n − 1 edges, we end up with O(n) keys necessary for confidential and authentic end-to-end security, as opposed to O(n 2 ) in the conventional setting of symmetric encryption.
Discussion
Multipath transmission schemes in UNNs offer the remarkable possibility of doing something like public-key cryptography without public-key cryptography: the sender Alice can send an authentic and confidential message to Bob, with both properties provably implied by graph-topological features only, and not resting on (unproven) computational intractability. Moreover, Alice and Bob use only publicly available information for that purpose, with all matters of symmetric cryptography being handled below the application layer (thus, the crypto is entirely transparent). Unlike computational intractability, an ISP can easily assure these conditions to hold in a publicly verifiable manner, and without bothering its customers Alice or Bob with any key-management at all. This may especially be interesting in emerging networks such like the internet-of-things (IoT). This note leaves a set of problems open for future research, such as properties and complexity of the optimization problem (2), and practical (algorithmic) matters of routing. For ad hoc networks, it is interesting to compute the likelihood of a random graph to be a UNN. This property will not necessarily emerge suddenly unlike other graph properties, due to lack of monotonicity. However, the non-monotonicity in connection with the application in the IoT and ad hoc networking may render UNNs interesting objects to study in the context of random graphs.
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